But maybe that’s wrong; and, if it is, then maybe if we were to stop saying that philosophy isconceptual analysis, that would leave philosophers without a defensible metatheory. Well, if so, so be it. We wouldn’t beworse off in that respect than doctors, lawyers, dentists, artists, physicists, chicken sexers, psychologists, drivinginstructors, or the practitioners of any other respectable discipline that I can think of. Why should philosophers beexempt from this practically universal predicament? There are many classes of performances in which intelligence isdisplayed, but the rules or criteria of which are unformulated. Efficient practice precedes the theory of it;methodologies presuppose the application of the methods, of the critical investigation of which they are theproducts . . . It is therefore possible for people intelligently to perform some sorts of operations when they are not yetable to consider any propositions enjoining how they should be performed.

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Jean-marc pizano But maybe that’s wrong; and, if it is, then maybe if we were to stop saying that philosophy isconceptual analysis, that would leave philosophers without a defensible metatheory. Well, if so, so be it. We wouldn’t beworse off in that respect than doctors, lawyers, dentists, artists, physicists, chicken sexers, psychologists, drivinginstructors, or the practitioners of any other respectable discipline that I can think of. Why should philosophers beexempt from this practically universal predicament? There are many classes of performances in which intelligence isdisplayed, but the rules or criteria of which are unformulated. Efficient practice precedes the theory of it;methodologies presuppose the application of the methods, of the critical investigation of which they are theproducts . . . It is therefore possible for people intelligently to perform some sorts of operations when they are not yetable to consider any propositions enjoining how they should be performed.

 

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But, bless me, it seems that I am quoting from The Concept of Mind9 I’m sure that means that it’s time for me to stop.

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Appendix 7A Round Squares

I want briefly to consider an ontological worry about IA that’s relatively independent of the main issues that this chapter is concerned with.

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It seems pretty clear that IA is going to have to say that it’s metaphysically impossible for there to be a primitive concept of a self-contradictory property; e.g. a primitive concept ROUND SQUARE. (Remember that “ROUND SQUARE”is a name, not a structural description. The notation leaves it open whether the corresponding

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Ryle 1949.

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concept is atomic.) How the argument goes will depend on the details of IA’s formulation. But, roughly: IA says that concepts have to be locked to properties. Maybe it‘s OK for a concept to lock to a property that exists but happens notto be instantiated (like being a gold mountain), but presumably there isn’t any property of being a round square for thenecessarily uninstantiated concept ROUND SQUARE to lock to.

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That’s all right if ROUND SQUARE is assumed to be complex; it’s pretty plausible that there really isn’t anything to having ROUND SQUARE beyond the inferential dispositions that its compositional semantics bestows (viz. thedisposition to infer ROUND and SQUARE). But the corresponding primitive concept would have neither content(there’s no property for it to lock to) nor compositional structure (it has no constituents), so there could be nothing tohaving it at all. The objection is that it’s not obvious that it‘s metaphysically necessary that ROUND SQUARE couldn’tbe primitive.

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A possible reply is that it’s also not obvious that it could, so all you get is a hung jury. But I think maybe we can do a little better. Consider a non-self-contradictory property like being ared square. It’s common ground for any RTM thatthere is a complex concept of this property (constructed from the concepts RED and SQUARE). But it’s built intoinformational versions of RTM that it also allows there to be a simple concept of this property; viz. a primitive mentalrepresentation REDSQUARE (sic.; this is intended to be a structural description) that is locked to being red and square.Presumably, one could acquire REDSQUARE ostensively. That is, one could get locked to being red and square (not byfirst getting locked to being red and being square, but) by learning that redsquares (sic) are the things that look like those. SoInformational Atomism acknowledges the metaphysical possibility of having the concept of a red square withouthaving either the concept RED or the concept SQUARE. (You won’t, of course, admit that RED SQUARE could be,in this sense, primitive if you boggle at concepts without conceptual roles. But if you boggle at concepts withoutconceptual roles you can‘t accept a pure informational semantics at all, so why should you care what a pureinformational semantics says about concepts of self-contradictory properties?)

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If, on the other hand, you find it intuitively plausible that there are two ways of having a concept of a red square (viz. RED SQUARE, which you can’t have unless you’ve got RED and SQUARE, and REDSQUARE, which you canbecause it’s primitive) then everything is OK about IA’s treatment of the concept ROUND SQUARE.Jean-marc pizano

RTM also requires concepts to have their contents essentially. The versions of RTM that are currently standard in philosophy andin cognitive science, however, want still more: most lexical concepts should not be primitive, and the content ofconcepts should be determined, at least inter alia, by their inferential-cum-causal relations to one another. I think,however, that the evidence is getting pretty solid that the last two conditions can’t be met; lexical concepts typicallydon’t act as though they were internally structured by either psychological or linguistic 26test. And the question which aspects of a concept’s inferential role are the ones that determine its meaning appears to behopeless. Thus far has the World Spirit progressed.

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Jean-marc pizano RTM also requires concepts to have their contents essentially. The versions of RTM that are currently standard in philosophy andin cognitive science, however, want still more: most lexical concepts should not be primitive, and the content ofconcepts should be determined, at least inter alia, by their inferential-cum-causal relations to one another. I think,however, that the evidence is getting pretty solid that the last two conditions can’t be met; lexical concepts typicallydon’t act as though they were internally structured by either psychological or linguistic 26test. And the question which aspects of a concept’s inferential role are the ones that determine its meaning appears to behopeless. Thus far has the World Spirit progressed.

 

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I propose, therefore, that we scrap the standard versions of RTM and consider, in their place, a doctrine that I’ll call Informational Atomism. (IA for short.) IA has an informational part and it has an atomistic part. To wit:

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—Informational semantics: content is constituted by some sort of nomic, mind—world relation. Correspondingly, having a concept (concept possession) is constituted, at least in part, by being in some sort of nomic,mind—world relation.

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—Conceptual atomism: most lexical concepts have no internal structure.

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As far as I can tell, nobody but me thinks that IA has a prayer of being true; not even people who are quite sympathetic to RTM. Now, why is that, do you suppose?

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I can imagine three objections to IA (however, see Appendix 7A). The first of these I’m prepared not to take very seriously, but the second two need some discussion. Most of this chapter and the next one are devoted to them. Ishould say at the outset that I regard what follows as very tentative indeed. Though the standard versions of RTMhave been explored practically to death, IA is virgin territory. The best I hope for is a rough sketch of the geography.

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First objection: If atomism is true and most lexical concepts have no internal structure, then there is no such thing as the analysis of most of the concepts that philosophers care about. That BROWN COW has a philosophical analysis (intoBROWN and COW) isn’t much consolation.

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Reply: Strictly speaking, you can have conceptual analysis without structured concepts since, strictly speaking, you can have analyticity without structured concepts (see Appendix 5A). You do, however, have to live with the failure ofattempts to reduce analyticity to conceptual containment. And you have to live with the general lack of empiricalsanction for claims that satisfying the possession conditions for some concept A requires satisfying the possessionconditions for some other concept B. As far as I can tell, there is little or no evidence for such claims except bruteappeals to intuition; and, as we saw in Chapter 4, a case can be made that the intuitions thus appealed to are corrupt.

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On the other hand, who cares about conceptual analysis? It’s a commonplace that its successes have been, to put it mildly, very sparse. Indeed, viewed from the cognitive psychologist’s perspective, the main point about conceptualanalysis is that it’s supposed to fail. For all sorts of

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quotidian concepts, its answers to ‘What is their content?’ and to ‘How do you acquire them?’ are, respectively, ‘It has none’ and ‘You don’t’. It’s worth bearing in mind that analytic philosophy, from Hume to Carnap inclusive, was acritical programme. For the Empiricists, the idea was to constrain the conditions for concept possession a priori, byconstraining the acceptable relations between concepts and percepts. It would then turn out that you really don’t havemany of the concepts that you think you have; you don’t have GOD, CAUSE, or TRIANGLE at all, and thoughperhaps you do have DOG, it’s not the sort of concept that you had supposed it to be. “When we run over thelibraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make?” (Hume 1955: 3.) Post-Positivist philosophicalanalysis has wavered between reconstruction and deconstruction, succeeding in neither. Most practitioners now holdthat we do have DOG, CAUSE, and TRIANGLE after all; maybe even GOD. But they none the less insist that thereare substantive, a priori, epistemological constraints on concept possession. These, in the fullness of time, analysis willreveal; to the confusion of Sceptics, Metaphysical Realists, Mentalists, Cartesians, and the like.Jean-marc pizano

Something like that went on in philosophy too. Philosophers cared about definitions because they offered a handy construal of the thesis that inferential connections are sometimes intrinsic to the concepts that enter into them: viz.complex concepts are constituted by their inferential relations to the concepts in their definitions. Correspondingly, philosophicalaffection for definitions waned when intrinsic conceptual connectedness fell into disrepute (as it did in the US inconsequence of Quine’s strictures on analyticity) and when epistemological construals of intrinsic conceptualconnectedness bade fare to displace semantic ones (as they did in the UK in the criteriological philosophy ofWittgenstein and his followers).

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Something like that went on in philosophy too. Philosophers cared about definitions because they offered a handy construal of the thesis that inferential connections are sometimes intrinsic to the concepts that enter into them: viz.complex concepts are constituted by their inferential relations to the concepts in their definitions. Correspondingly, philosophicalaffection for definitions waned when intrinsic conceptual connectedness fell into disrepute (as it did in the US inconsequence of Quine’s strictures on analyticity) and when epistemological construals of intrinsic conceptualconnectedness bade fare to displace semantic ones (as they did in the UK in the criteriological philosophy ofWittgenstein and his followers).

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Philosophers do like the idea of there being lots of intrinsic connections among concepts; even philosophers who think there aren’t any often sort of wish that there were. The idea is that an inference that constitutes the concepts whichenter into it can be known a priori to be sound. Andinferences that can be known a priori to be sound are prized by philosophers because they are useful for boppingsceptics over the head with. Thus:

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Sceptic. You can‘t ever infer with certainty from how things look to how they are.

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Antisceptic. Can too, because there is an intrinsic conceptual connection between how-things-look concepts and how-things-are concepts (between behaviour-concepts and mind-concepts; between is-concepts and ought-concepts, etc. etc.). Bop. I win.

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Sceptic. I don’t acknowledge such intrinsic connections.

Antisceptic. Then you don’t have the concepts! Bop. I still win.

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And even philosophers who don’t care much about scepticism sometimes get hooked on intrinsic conceptual connectedness out of their concern for full employment. What else but constitutive connections among concepts isthere for a philosophical analysis to be the philosophical analysis of? And, if there are no philosophical analyses, whatare analytic philosophers for?

In short, when philosophers opt for definitions it’s usually less because they’re independently convinced that the theory of language or the theory of mind requires them than because constitutive conceptual connectedness seems worthhaving if buying into definitions is the cost. There may be some other way to get such connections (see Appendix 5A),but definitions are a convenient way, and one which, unlike criteriology, can be scrupulous about keeping epistemologyout of semantics.

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So, if you’re interested in what philosophers have to say that bears on whether concepts are definitions, it’s their discussions of conceptual connectedness that are most likely to be relevant. These days, what one often hears listeningin on such discussions is some version of the following line of thought.

—It’s right that you can’t infer that there are intrinsic conceptual connections simply from the premiss that if there were, they would be useful for antisceptical employment.

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—However, Quine’s arguments that there are no such connections aren’t conclusive; in fact, nobody seems to be able to agree about exactly what Quine’s arguments are.

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—There is a field of data for the explanation of which the notion of intrinsic conceptual connection appears to be well suited. These data include intuitions that certain propositions are analytic (hence necessary, hence apriori). Paradigms are no bachelors are married, Tuesdays precede Wednesdays, and so on. There are, as you’d expect,also the corresponding intuitions about concept possession.; no one who lacked the concept MARRIED couldhave the concept BACHELOR; no one who lacked the concept WEEKDAY or the concept WEDNESDAYcould have the concept TUESDAY, and so on. This is all as it should be. If a connection between two conceptsis constitutive, you can’t have the one unless you have the other.

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—Given that there are these intuitions, we are justified in appealing to a notion of intrinsic conceptual connectedness as a sort of theoretical posit, even if we can’t produce a satisfactory account of such connectionscash in hand.

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—Maybe whatever explication of intrinsic conceptual connection proves, eventually, to account for these intuitions will correspondingly elucidate such notions as definition, analyticity, aprioricity, and the rest. Maybe it will even dosome work against sceptics, who knows? Anyhow, since the intuitions are strong and the a priori argumentsagainst analyticity aren’t conclusive, it’s not reasonable to take for granted that there are no intrinsic conceptualconnections.Jean-marc pizano

RTM also requires concepts to have their contents essentially. The versions of RTM that are currently standard in philosophy andin cognitive science, however, want still more: most lexical concepts should not be primitive, and the content ofconcepts should be determined, at least inter alia, by their inferential-cum-causal relations to one another. I think,however, that the evidence is getting pretty solid that the last two conditions can’t be met; lexical concepts typicallydon’t act as though they were internally structured by either psychological or linguistic 26test. And the question which aspects of a concept’s inferential role are the ones that determine its meaning appears to behopeless. Thus far has the World Spirit progressed.

Standard

Jean-marc pizano RTM also requires concepts to have their contents essentially. The versions of RTM that are currently standard in philosophy andin cognitive science, however, want still more: most lexical concepts should not be primitive, and the content ofconcepts should be determined, at least inter alia, by their inferential-cum-causal relations to one another. I think,however, that the evidence is getting pretty solid that the last two conditions can’t be met; lexical concepts typicallydon’t act as though they were internally structured by either psychological or linguistic 26test. And the question which aspects of a concept’s inferential role are the ones that determine its meaning appears to behopeless. Thus far has the World Spirit progressed.

 

I propose, therefore, that we scrap the standard versions of RTM and consider, in their place, a doctrine that I’ll call Informational Atomism. (IA for short.) IA has an informational part and it has an atomistic part. To wit:

—Informational semantics: content is constituted by some sort of nomic, mind—world relation. Correspondingly, having a concept (concept possession) is constituted, at least in part, by being in some sort of nomic,mind—world relation.

—Conceptual atomism: most lexical concepts have no internal structure.

As far as I can tell, nobody but me thinks that IA has a prayer of being true; not even people who are quite sympathetic to RTM. Now, why is that, do you suppose?

I can imagine three objections to IA (however, see Appendix 7A). The first of these I’m prepared not to take very seriously, but the second two need some discussion. Most of this chapter and the next one are devoted to them. Ishould say at the outset that I regard what follows as very tentative indeed. Though the standard versions of RTMhave been explored practically to death, IA is virgin territory. The best I hope for is a rough sketch of the geography.

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First objection: If atomism is true and most lexical concepts have no internal structure, then there is no such thing as the analysis of most of the concepts that philosophers care about. That BROWN COW has a philosophical analysis (intoBROWN and COW) isn’t much consolation.

Reply: Strictly speaking, you can have conceptual analysis without structured concepts since, strictly speaking, you can have analyticity without structured concepts (see Appendix 5A). You do, however, have to live with the failure ofattempts to reduce analyticity to conceptual containment. And you have to live with the general lack of empiricalsanction for claims that satisfying the possession conditions for some concept A requires satisfying the possessionconditions for some other concept B. As far as I can tell, there is little or no evidence for such claims except bruteappeals to intuition; and, as we saw in Chapter 4, a case can be made that the intuitions thus appealed to are corrupt.

On the other hand, who cares about conceptual analysis? It’s a commonplace that its successes have been, to put it mildly, very sparse. Indeed, viewed from the cognitive psychologist’s perspective, the main point about conceptualanalysis is that it’s supposed to fail. For all sorts of

quotidian concepts, its answers to ‘What is their content?’ and to ‘How do you acquire them?’ are, respectively, ‘It has none’ and ‘You don’t’. It’s worth bearing in mind that analytic philosophy, from Hume to Carnap inclusive, was acritical programme. For the Empiricists, the idea was to constrain the conditions for concept possession a priori, byconstraining the acceptable relations between concepts and percepts. It would then turn out that you really don’t havemany of the concepts that you think you have; you don’t have GOD, CAUSE, or TRIANGLE at all, and thoughperhaps you do have DOG, it’s not the sort of concept that you had supposed it to be. “When we run over thelibraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make?” (Hume 1955: 3.) Post-Positivist philosophicalanalysis has wavered between reconstruction and deconstruction, succeeding in neither. Most practitioners now holdthat we do have DOG, CAUSE, and TRIANGLE after all; maybe even GOD. But they none the less insist that thereare substantive, a priori, epistemological constraints on concept possession. These, in the fullness of time, analysis willreveal; to the confusion of Sceptics, Metaphysical Realists, Mentalists, Cartesians, and the like.Jean-marc pizano

RTM also requires concepts to have their contents essentially. The versions of RTM that are currently standard in philosophy andin cognitive science, however, want still more: most lexical concepts should not be primitive, and the content ofconcepts should be determined, at least inter alia, by their inferential-cum-causal relations to one another. I think,however, that the evidence is getting pretty solid that the last two conditions can’t be met; lexical concepts typicallydon’t act as though they were internally structured by either psychological or linguistic 26test. And the question which aspects of a concept’s inferential role are the ones that determine its meaning appears to behopeless. Thus far has the World Spirit progressed.

Standard

Jean-marc pizano RTM also requires concepts to have their contents essentially. The versions of RTM that are currently standard in philosophy andin cognitive science, however, want still more: most lexical concepts should not be primitive, and the content ofconcepts should be determined, at least inter alia, by their inferential-cum-causal relations to one another. I think,however, that the evidence is getting pretty solid that the last two conditions can’t be met; lexical concepts typicallydon’t act as though they were internally structured by either psychological or linguistic 26test. And the question which aspects of a concept’s inferential role are the ones that determine its meaning appears to behopeless. Thus far has the World Spirit progressed.

 

I propose, therefore, that we scrap the standard versions of RTM and consider, in their place, a doctrine that I’ll call Informational Atomism. (IA for short.) IA has an informational part and it has an atomistic part. To wit:

—Informational semantics: content is constituted by some sort of nomic, mind—world relation. Correspondingly, having a concept (concept possession) is constituted, at least in part, by being in some sort of nomic,mind—world relation.

—Conceptual atomism: most lexical concepts have no internal structure.

As far as I can tell, nobody but me thinks that IA has a prayer of being true; not even people who are quite sympathetic to RTM. Now, why is that, do you suppose?

I can imagine three objections to IA (however, see Appendix 7A). The first of these I’m prepared not to take very seriously, but the second two need some discussion. Most of this chapter and the next one are devoted to them. Ishould say at the outset that I regard what follows as very tentative indeed. Though the standard versions of RTMhave been explored practically to death, IA is virgin territory. The best I hope for is a rough sketch of the geography.

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First objection: If atomism is true and most lexical concepts have no internal structure, then there is no such thing as the analysis of most of the concepts that philosophers care about. That BROWN COW has a philosophical analysis (intoBROWN and COW) isn’t much consolation.

Reply: Strictly speaking, you can have conceptual analysis without structured concepts since, strictly speaking, you can have analyticity without structured concepts (see Appendix 5A). You do, however, have to live with the failure ofattempts to reduce analyticity to conceptual containment. And you have to live with the general lack of empiricalsanction for claims that satisfying the possession conditions for some concept A requires satisfying the possessionconditions for some other concept B. As far as I can tell, there is little or no evidence for such claims except bruteappeals to intuition; and, as we saw in Chapter 4, a case can be made that the intuitions thus appealed to are corrupt.

On the other hand, who cares about conceptual analysis? It’s a commonplace that its successes have been, to put it mildly, very sparse. Indeed, viewed from the cognitive psychologist’s perspective, the main point about conceptualanalysis is that it’s supposed to fail. For all sorts of

quotidian concepts, its answers to ‘What is their content?’ and to ‘How do you acquire them?’ are, respectively, ‘It has none’ and ‘You don’t’. It’s worth bearing in mind that analytic philosophy, from Hume to Carnap inclusive, was acritical programme. For the Empiricists, the idea was to constrain the conditions for concept possession a priori, byconstraining the acceptable relations between concepts and percepts. It would then turn out that you really don’t havemany of the concepts that you think you have; you don’t have GOD, CAUSE, or TRIANGLE at all, and thoughperhaps you do have DOG, it’s not the sort of concept that you had supposed it to be. “When we run over thelibraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make?” (Hume 1955: 3.) Post-Positivist philosophicalanalysis has wavered between reconstruction and deconstruction, succeeding in neither. Most practitioners now holdthat we do have DOG, CAUSE, and TRIANGLE after all; maybe even GOD. But they none the less insist that thereare substantive, a priori, epistemological constraints on concept possession. These, in the fullness of time, analysis willreveal; to the confusion of Sceptics, Metaphysical Realists, Mentalists, Cartesians, and the like.Jean-marc pizano

But maybe that’s wrong; and, if it is, then maybe if we were to stop saying that philosophy isconceptual analysis, that would leave philosophers without a defensible metatheory. Well, if so, so be it. We wouldn’t beworse off in that respect than doctors, lawyers, dentists, artists, physicists, chicken sexers, psychologists, drivinginstructors, or the practitioners of any other respectable discipline that I can think of. Why should philosophers beexempt from this practically universal predicament? There are many classes of performances in which intelligence isdisplayed, but the rules or criteria of which are unformulated. Efficient practice precedes the theory of it;methodologies presuppose the application of the methods, of the critical investigation of which they are theproducts . . . It is therefore possible for people intelligently to perform some sorts of operations when they are not yetable to consider any propositions enjoining how they should be performed.

Standard

Jean-marc pizano But maybe that’s wrong; and, if it is, then maybe if we were to stop saying that philosophy isconceptual analysis, that would leave philosophers without a defensible metatheory. Well, if so, so be it. We wouldn’t beworse off in that respect than doctors, lawyers, dentists, artists, physicists, chicken sexers, psychologists, drivinginstructors, or the practitioners of any other respectable discipline that I can think of. Why should philosophers beexempt from this practically universal predicament? There are many classes of performances in which intelligence isdisplayed, but the rules or criteria of which are unformulated. Efficient practice precedes the theory of it;methodologies presuppose the application of the methods, of the critical investigation of which they are theproducts . . . It is therefore possible for people intelligently to perform some sorts of operations when they are not yetable to consider any propositions enjoining how they should be performed.

 

But, bless me, it seems that I am quoting from The Concept of Mind9 I’m sure that means that it’s time for me to stop.

Appendix 7A Round Squares

I want briefly to consider an ontological worry about IA that’s relatively independent of the main issues that this chapter is concerned with.

It seems pretty clear that IA is going to have to say that it’s metaphysically impossible for there to be a primitive concept of a self-contradictory property; e.g. a primitive concept ROUND SQUARE. (Remember that “ROUND SQUARE”is a name, not a structural description. The notation leaves it open whether the corresponding

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Ryle 1949.

concept is atomic.) How the argument goes will depend on the details of IA’s formulation. But, roughly: IA says that concepts have to be locked to properties. Maybe it‘s OK for a concept to lock to a property that exists but happens notto be instantiated (like being a gold mountain), but presumably there isn’t any property of being a round square for thenecessarily uninstantiated concept ROUND SQUARE to lock to.

That’s all right if ROUND SQUARE is assumed to be complex; it’s pretty plausible that there really isn’t anything to having ROUND SQUARE beyond the inferential dispositions that its compositional semantics bestows (viz. thedisposition to infer ROUND and SQUARE). But the corresponding primitive concept would have neither content(there’s no property for it to lock to) nor compositional structure (it has no constituents), so there could be nothing tohaving it at all. The objection is that it’s not obvious that it‘s metaphysically necessary that ROUND SQUARE couldn’tbe primitive.

A possible reply is that it’s also not obvious that it could, so all you get is a hung jury. But I think maybe we can do a little better. Consider a non-self-contradictory property like being ared square. It’s common ground for any RTM thatthere is a complex concept of this property (constructed from the concepts RED and SQUARE). But it’s built intoinformational versions of RTM that it also allows there to be a simple concept of this property; viz. a primitive mentalrepresentation REDSQUARE (sic.; this is intended to be a structural description) that is locked to being red and square.Presumably, one could acquire REDSQUARE ostensively. That is, one could get locked to being red and square (not byfirst getting locked to being red and being square, but) by learning that redsquares (sic) are the things that look like those. SoInformational Atomism acknowledges the metaphysical possibility of having the concept of a red square withouthaving either the concept RED or the concept SQUARE. (You won’t, of course, admit that RED SQUARE could be,in this sense, primitive if you boggle at concepts without conceptual roles. But if you boggle at concepts withoutconceptual roles you can‘t accept a pure informational semantics at all, so why should you care what a pureinformational semantics says about concepts of self-contradictory properties?)

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If, on the other hand, you find it intuitively plausible that there are two ways of having a concept of a red square (viz. RED SQUARE, which you can’t have unless you’ve got RED and SQUARE, and REDSQUARE, which you canbecause it’s primitive) then everything is OK about IA’s treatment of the concept ROUND SQUARE.Jean-marc pizano